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McCall James
A Basic Concern for Process:
Commentary on Quo Vadis, Prospective
Overruling
by
JAMES R. MCCALL*
Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility,1 has enjoyed a formidable subsequent citation history
since it appeared in the Hastings Law Journal in 1977.2 In part, the
frequency with which Quo Vadis has been cited was the result of
Traynor's reputation as Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court. At the time the article was published, Traynor was commonly
praised by scholars and jurists in such terms as "our number one
judge' 3 and "the ablest judge of his generation in the United States."'4
Notwithstanding such praise for his work as a judge, Traynor
routinely defined himself as an academic. When he wrote Quo Vadis,
Traynor was enjoying what was probably the ultimate professional
pleasure of his life-a one year appointment to a professorship at
Cambridge University.5
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California. A.B.
Pomona College, 1958, J.D. Harvard Law School, 1962. The research of Kathleen Friend,
Hastings College of Law, Class of 2000, greatly assisted the writing of this comment.
1. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977) [hereinafter Quo Vadis]. "Quo vadis" is Latin
for "wither goest thou?" See JOHN R. STONE, LATIN FOR THE ILLITERATI 80 (1996). The
author wishes to thank Ms. Linda Weir, Head of Public Services of the Hastings Law
Library, for her help in developing this information.
2. Quo Vadis has been cited at least thirty one-times in reported judicial decisions by
the courts of sixteen states, two federal Circuits, and, on one occasion, the U.S. Supreme
Court. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 195 (1990).
Computerized records show that Quo Vadis has been cited in thirty-four law review
articles since 1983.
3. Walter v. Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the Judicial Process, 53 CAL. L. REv.
11,24 (1965).
4. Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1039
(1983).
5. See text at footnote 22, 24.
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For many reasons, Traynor will be linked to Chief Justice Earl
Warren in the annals of American legal history.6  The two
Californians were historical contemporaries, and both were judges
who successfully worked for dramatic liberal reform of the law.7
Warren's actions as California Attorney General produced the
unintended consequence of Roger Traynor's appointment to the
California Supreme Court in 1940.8 Because Warren had hired
Traynor to work as a consultant in the California Attorney General's
Office, Governor Olson thought that Warren could not publicly
oppose Traynor if Olson nominated him for a state supreme court
vacancy. Olson nominated Traynor, Warren supported the
nomination, and Traynor was confirmed. He eventually served on
the court for three decades. Warren became Governor by beating
Olson in the 1942 election and was still serving in that office when he
was appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court in
1953.
Traynor, a forty year old Boalt Hall law professor when
nominated, was the first academic lawyer to be appointed to the
California Supreme Court. More surprisingly, he also was the first
graduate of Boalt Hall to be become a justice on that court.9 He
quickly established a reputation for sophisticated reform of the
common law and ground breaking Constitutional interpretation. 10 In
6. See Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten: America's Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 405,438-39.
7. In addition, Traynor and Warren received their college and law school educations
at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, lived in Alameda County, and had
many friends and professional associates in common. The two men were friends, although
the relationship was not close, and each genuinely admired the other's strengths. See Earl
Warren, Letter of Appreciation of Roger J. Traynor, 53 CAL. L. REV. 5 (1967); Roger J.
Traynor, Chief Justice Warren's Fair Question, 58 GEo L.J. 1 (1969).
8. Warren, a Republican, was elected California Attorney General in 1938. At the
same election, Democrat Culbert Olson was elected Governor. Warren objected to
Olson's original nominee for appointment to the California Supreme Court and
eventually persuaded the committee that had to approve judicial nominations to reject the
nominee. Olson then chose Traynor as a replacement nominee. See JOHN D. WEAVER,
WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 71-73 (1967).
9. Since Traynor's appointment in 1940, the following Boalt Hall graduates have
served on the California Supreme Court: Raymond E. Peters (1959-1973), Rose E. Bird
(1977-1986), Frank E. Newman (1977-1982), Allen E. Broussard (1981-1991), Cruz
Reynoso (1982-1986) and Kathryn M. Werdegar (1994-present).
10. Traynor's first major opinions reforming the common law were Imperial Ice Co. v.
Rossier, 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941), in which Traynor established the current limitations on
the cause of action for inducing a contract, and Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat7 Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 112 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942), in which Traynor expanded the concept of collateral
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the field of Constitutional law Traynor wrote opinions setting out the
present view of First Amendment protection for free speech in the
"school board cases."" In Perez v. Sharp,2 Traynor wrote an opinion
striking down the California anti-miscegenation statute. Perez was
the first judicial opinion to hold this type of statute unconstitutional.
Scholarly writing was a routine activity for a man who had made
his way in the world as a gifted and industrious student and who had
become a law professor soon after graduation from law school. 13
Traynor published his first law review article while a student at Boalt
Hall in 192614 and published his last shortly before he retired from
teaching at Hastings College of Law in 1980.15 During this fifty-four
year period, he published ninety scholarly pieces.
During the first sixteen years of Traynor's service on the
California Supreme Court, he published no extrajudicial writing. The
first of his "judicial period" articles appeared in 1956.16 These articles
were almost always first given as addresses at law schools and
subsequently published in the school's law review.17 His topics
usually related to his philosophy of judging, often with illustrations of
important points from his published opinions.'8 Traynor wrote forty-
estoppel to its modem dimensions.
11. See Payroll Guarantee Ass'n v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 163 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1945); Ellis v. Board of Education, 164 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1945);
Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 171 P.2d 885 (Cal. 1946).
12. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
13. Traynor worked as an associate in the newly formed office of Brobeck, Phleger
and Harrison in San Francisco for a few months between his law school graduation in June
1927 and taking a position as an instructor at Boalt Hall the following January.
14. The article was a short student comment published during Traynor's second year
as a law student at Boalt Hall. See Roger J. Traynor, Note, Adverse Possession: Personal
Property: Tacking and Payment of Taxes, 14 CAL. L. REV. 218 (1926).
15. Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate
Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 255.
16. See Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U.
ILL. L. F. 230 [hereinafter Traynor, Law and Social Change].
17. E.g., id. (given at the dedication of the new University of Illinois Law Building);
Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI.
L. REV. 211 (1957) (given at a University of Chicago Law School Conference on Judicial
Administration) [hereinafter Traynor, Some Open Questions]; Roger J. Traynor,
Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1957) (given at a University of Minnesota
Law School ceremony honoring Professor Henry Rottschaefer) [hereinafter Traynor,
Unjustifiable Reliance].
18. Traynor's first three judicial period articles were on such topics of judicial theory
as judges as lawmakers, see Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 16, the need for
logically coherent opinions, see Traynor, Some Open Questions, supra note 17, and judicial
fallibility, see Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, supra note 17. The first of only six judicial
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two judicial period articles before his retirement from the court in
January 1970. At the time of his death, in 1983, Traynor was the most
prolific judicial writer of scholarly articles in American history.19
Other scholarly judges published books either before or during
Traynor's career on the bench-most notably Benjamin Cardozo and
Learned Hand, who published The Growth of the Law20 and The
Spirit of Liberty,2 respectively. However, judicial authorship of
numerous law review articles was unknown prior to Traynor.
Upon retirement from the California Supreme Court, Traynor
immediately returned to academic life as a law professor at Hastings.
In the first two years of his resumed career Traynor published a book
and eight articles. 22 The article Quo Vadis is highly representative of
the basic orientation of Traynor's scholarship during his years at
Hastings-scornful of the formalist approach to law and proposing a
sophisticated concept of judicial restraint based upon fundamental
requirements of the judicial process.23
Traynor wrote Quo Vadis while serving as the Arthur Goodhart
Professor at Cambridge University for the academic year 1974-75.24
The subject matter of the article reflected Traynor's teaching interests
while on the Hastings faculty, criminal procedure and the judicial
process.25 He had become a criminal procedure expert while
period articles Traynor wrote on subjects of legal doctrine was Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1959).
19. Traynor's rate of article publication has been surpassed by Judges Richard A.
Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, both sitting on the Seventh Circuit. Posner has
published over seventy-five articles and several books during his tenure on the court, and
Easterbrook has weighed-in with forty published law review articles since his appointment
to the bench in 1985.
20. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OFTHE LAW (1924).
21. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1st ed. 1952).
22. Traynor eventually published Quo Vadis and twenty other articles during his ten
years on the Hastings faculty.
23. E.g., in the last of his published articles, Traynor cautioned courts against
succumbing to the pleas of "astute hawkers of alleged good causes" to act as "surrogate
legislatures" in determining policy issues that are either too large for court action or
beyond the scope of the dispute presented by the case. See Traynor, Transatlantic
Reflections, supra note 15, at 281.
24. Traynor presented the article as an address at the University of Birmingham,
England in the Spring of 1975.
25. Traynor taught a lecture course in criminal procedure and a seminar on the judicial
process. He also taught a lecture course in conflict of laws at Hastings. Traynor had
achieved a national reputation as a tax law teacher and scholar while on the Boalt Hall
faculty in the 1930s. When he was appointed to the California Supreme Court in 1940 he
had no specialized knowledge of any field of law other than state and federal taxation.
[Vol. 50
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reforming California law in this area in the 1950s.26 However, the
intellectual core of the article was the product of his career-long
interest in judicial theory and the practical commands and constraints
of that theory.
Traynor planned and wrote Quo Vadis during the 1970s. At the
time, scholars were having "a veritable field day"27 with the Warren
Court's opinions on prospective overruling. The controversy, which
lasted approximately fifteen years, arose because the U.S. Supreme
Court issued many opinions during the 1960s overruling longstanding
Constitutional precedents.
These overruling opinions produced "new law" and raised the
question whether the new law would be applied under the traditional
rule of full retroactive effect. Under that rule any new law
established by appellate court opinions must be applied in reviewing
any judgment on appeal. "Final judgments," meaning judgments on
which either appellate review had been exhausted or the time for
further appellate review had expired, are no longer subject to such
"direct review" in appellate proceedings. Thus, under the traditional
rule, full retroactive effect meant that new law would be applied only
on direct review of lower court proceedings.
The importance of the extent of retroactive application was
heightened by a 1963 Supreme Court opinion that expanded the
power of federal courts to exercise "collateral review" of the
administration of criminal justice by state courts by issuing writs of
habeas corpus.28 In practical terms, the Court's holding meant that
federal courts could collaterally review state court judgments of
conviction that had become final and invalidate those judgments
when the procedures used by state law enforcement officials violated
standards established by new law. If broad reaching new law was to
be applied on collateral review as well as direct review, the potential
number of reversals of past state convictions seemed a daunting
prospect.
26. Traynor's criminal procedure opinions for the California Supreme Court
anticipated of many of the Warren Court reforms of the 1960s. See People v. Riser, 305
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1956) (holding that the prosecution must furnish the accused with any
evidence it possesses which could be useful for impeaching witnesses to the accused);
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) (adopting the exclusionary rule as an evidence
law concept); People v. Brown, 290 P.2d 528 (Cal. 1955) (holding that the fruits of a search
incident to a lawful arrest are admissible only if the search is reasonable).
27. Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61
VA. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1975).
28. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-414 (1963).
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The Warren Court overhauled the law of criminal procedure in
two famous opinions. In Mapp v. Ohio,29 the Court held that the
federal exclusionary rule was applicable to state court criminal trials
under the Fourth Amendment. 30 In Miranda v. Arizona,31 the Court
held that confessions obtained without the now familiar Miranda
warnings were inadmissible.32 If the new law from Mapp and
Miranda applied on collateral review of final state court judgments,
the result would be the "wholesale release of the guilty. '33
In response to this problem, the Court held in Linkletter v.
Walker34 that the common law rule of full retroactive effect did not
require that retroactive effect on collateral review be given to the new
law announced in Mapp.35 One year later, in Johnson v. New Jersey,36
the Court went much further by essentially eliminating retroactive
effect of the new law announced in Miranda on direct review of many
judgments of conviction.37 There, the Court decided that the Miranda
holding would not be applied to convictions in which the trial had
begun before the effective date of the Miranda decision.38 Finally, in
Desist v. United States,39 the Court held that the new law it had
established in Katz v. United States4 would only apply to evidence
procured by police officers after the effective date of the Katz
opinion.41 Both Johnson and Desist made the effect of the opinions
solely prospective by holding that the new law would only apply to
future events.
In Quo Vadis, Traynor discussed the general subject of
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. See id. at 654-55 (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. See id. at 444-45. The Court's holding in Miranda had been foreshadowed in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,484-92 (1964).
33. Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)
34. Id.
35. Id. at 639-40. Linkletter left open the possibility that retroactive application of new
law affecting "the very integrity of the fact-finding process" on collateral review would be
required. Id. at 639.
36. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
37. See id. at 732-35.
38. See id.
39. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz held that the Fourth Amendment restriction on illegal
seizure of speech could be applied in situations in which the police did not "physically
intrude" into an enclosure to "seize" the speech through eavesdropping or recording. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53. The opinion overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
41. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 246-54.
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prospective overruling at length and traced the history of the concept
in civil as well as criminal law in the United States and England. 42
However, the central point of the article was a strong disapproval of
the concept of prospective overruling developed in Johnson, which
Traynor described as "baffling except in terms of expediency." 43 This
rejection of Johnson was based upon Traynor's view of the
requirements of the American legal process.
Roger Traynor's deep concern about the legal process was a
common orientation for legal scholars of his generation, who
generally subscribed to a judicial theory that gave process concerns
highest priority. The "legal process" scholars, many of whom were
Traynor's personal friends, believed that the retroactive effect
normally given to judicial precedent was an essential hallmark of the
process of adjudication. Indeed, the retroactive effect of the judicial
process served to distinguish it from the legislative process, which has
an exclusively prospective effect. The fact that judicial overruling of a
past precedent usually has a significant retroactive effect was viewed
as a crucial restraining influence on the exercise of judicial power.44
The first major point in Quo Vadis asserted that prospective
overruling, when used on very rare occasions, is a legitimate judicial
device to achieve justice when overruling an outdated doctrine.45
Traynor's second major thesis was that the U.S. Supreme Court had
completely misconceived and mismanaged application of the concept
42. Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 543-58.
43. See iL, at 558. The subsequent judicial opinions that have discussed Quo Vadis, as
opposed to merely citing the article, have focused on Traynor's condemnation of Johnson.
See Commonwealth v. Cain, 369 A.2d 1234, 1263 (Pa. 1977) (dissenting opinion); State v.
Carpentieri, 414 A.2d 966, 978 (N.J. 1980) (dissenting opinion); Newman v. Emerson
Radio Corp., 772 P.2d 1059, 1062-64 (Cal. 1989).
44. One of the most important publications of the legal process school stated:
Acceptance of the possibility of overruling prior decisions with no more than
prospective effect relieves a court of one of the major practical restraints upon
free changes of law .... Do we have a working theory of the judicial function
which would be adequate to prevent judges for [sic] assuming political functions
and to avoid a disintegrating chaos of doctrine if the propriety of prospective
overruling were universally accepted?
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 606 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip Frickey
ed. 1994).
45. Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 541-42. In this connection, Traynor believed that
restricting retroactivity of new law to cases on direct review, as the Court had done in
Linkletter, was a legitimate exercise of judicial power. See Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 539.
Traynor had actually anticipated the Court's holding in Linkletter in his concurring
opinion in In re Harris, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (Cal. 1961).
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of prospective overruling in the Johnson opinion.46 He wrote that
"there is no wisdom" in the prospective overruling concept adopted
in Johnson because it used an arbitrary cut-off date to give strictly
prospective effect to Miranda.47
Traynor's criticism of Johnson was almost identical to the views
expressed by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his dissent in Desist.48
Although it took two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Griffith v.
Kentucky,49 eventually reversed the Johnson and Desist prospective
overruling concept and fully adopted the Harlan-Traynor view
requiring full retroactive application of new law to all cases in
judgments that had not yet become final.50
The U.S. Supreme Court did not cite Quo Vadis in Griffith.
However, the California Supreme Court was guided by Quo Vadis
and quoted extensively from it in resolving the prospective overruling
issue in Newman v. Emerson Radio Corporation.51 In this 1989
opinion, the court adopted the teaching of Quo Vadis as supporting
the view that full retroactive effect must be given to judicially
developed new law in almost all instances. Roger Traynor, as a legal
scholar and as a believer in the discipline of the legal process, would
have been pleased had he lived to read the Newman opinion.
46. Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 558-62.
47. The Court had made a very small exception to its holding that Miranda was to be
given "exclusively prospective effect" in Johnson, 384 U.S. at 732-33. The Court allowed
the appellants in Miranda and three companion cases to have the benefit of the new law of
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 491-99. Traynor stated that this exception raised "a grave question
of equal protection." Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 559.
48. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258. (Harlan, M., dissenting). Harlan asserted that the Court's
doctrines on retroactivity developed in Johnson and other cases "must be rethought" to
avoid arbitrary results. See id. Like Traynor, Harlan advocated the consistent application
of new law on direct review. Id. at 258-59. Traynor quoted Harlan's view on the issue in
Quo Vadis. See Quo Vadis, supra note 1, at 559, (quoting Harlan's concurring opinion in
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971)).
49. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
50. See id. at 320-28. The Court generally adopted Harlan's view in 1982. See United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982). In Griffith, the Court foreclosed any possible
exceptions to the rule of full retroactive application to cases on direct review.
51. 772 P.2d 1059, 1062-66 (Cal. 1989).
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